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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Brittney Fenn, Daniel Garriott, and Jane Johnson 
(collectively "Plaintiffs"), appeal from an order of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Sandy Division, Denise P. Lindberg, J., dated June 26,2003, granting 
Redmond Venture, Inc. ("RedV") summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' claims. F.R. at 
105-112.l Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Under Rules 59 and 60 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and For Discovery Under Rule 56(f) on July 3, 
2003. F.R. at 121-22. On October 20, 2003 the Court denied Plaintiffs'motion. F.R. at 
158-162. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal within 30 days of the entry of the order, 
thereby investing the Utah Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction. F.R. at 163-65; 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j); Utah R. App. P. 4(a). By subsequent order dated January 
14, 2004, and pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred the matter to this Court for disposition. Pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated, this Court now has jurisdiction over this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in refusing to alter or amend its judgment when the 
Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and where the "new information" upon which their motion to alter or amend 
In an effort to clearly identify the record, because it consists of three separate cases 
prior to consolidation, and have been individually numbered by the trial court, RedV will 
cite to each record individually as: F.R. - Fenn Record, G.R. - Garriott Record, and J.R. 
- Johnson Record. 
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judgment was based was known to Plaintiffs at the time they opposed summary 
judgment? 
This Court "reviewfs] a district court's rule 56(f) discovery rulings for abuse of 
discretion." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, \ 56, 70 P.3d 1; Brown v. 
Glover, 2000 UT 89, If 29, 16 P.3d 540 (affirming 56(f) ruling). This Court should "not 
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." Crossland Savings v. 
Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994) (explaining Court's standard of review of a 
56(f) motion). This Court reviews a denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion 
and "will revise only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision." Smith v. Fairfax 
Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,f25, 82 P.3d 1004. Similarly, this Court reviews a Rule 60 
motion for abuse of discretion. In re Matter of General Determination of the Rights to 
Use All of the Water, 1999 UT 39,122, 982 P.2d 65. 
2. Did the district court err in determining that RedV was not vicariously 
liable for actions of an independent contractor under Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101 et 
seq.l 
This Court "review[s] [a] district court's statutory interpretation for correctness." 
Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, \ 28, 70 P.3d 1; Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt v. City of 
Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, \ 9, 52 P.3d 1174. 
3. Did the district court err when it found that because there was no genuine 
dispute in the material facts, RedV was entitled to judgment as a matter of law? 
This Court reviews an appeal from a district court's "decision to grant summary 
judgment... for correctness." In the Matter of the Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 
639824v2 9 
3, Tfl2, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15; Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 
23,1J13, 70 P.3d 904; Woodbury Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, H 4, 
73 P.3d 362 (explaining that in reviewing a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 "we 
consider whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and whether it correctly applied the law"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Defendant and Appellee, Redmond Venture, Inc. ("RedV") asserts that Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(f) is determinative of (or of central importance to) this appeal. In 
addition, the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act is determinative of 
(or of central importance to) this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101-105 (2002). 
The full text of these provisions is set forth in full in Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs' Complaints arise out of the receipt of emails containing information 
about RedV products. F.R. at 2-3; G.R. at 2-3; J.R. at 2-3. RedV moved for Summary 
Judgment with a supporting affidavit from RedV's Chief Executive Officer Gane Kavner 
("Kavner") explaining that RedV never sent an email to Plaintiffs. F.R. at 42-46, 62-65; 
G.R. at 34-38, 40-43; J.R. at 11-15, 31-34. Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, 
supported by affidavits. G.R. at 64-101. However, Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum 
and supporting affidavits failed to request further discovery or explain why insufficient 
facts were known to oppose summary judgment. Id. On June 25, 2003, the Court entered 
a Memorandum Decision granting RedV's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all 
of Plaintiffs' claims. F.R. at 105-112; G.R. at 139-146; J.R. at 74-81. Shortly thereafter, 
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on July 3, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment claiming a 
need to conduct discovery pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). F.R. at 121-
22. Plaintiffs' motion did not include any affidavits. Id. RedV objected to Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment based upon, inter alia, Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f). F.R. at 140-53. On October 16, 2003, Judge 
Lindberg issued her Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment because, inter alia, Plaintiffs failed to make a proper Rule 56(f) request for 
discovery. F.R. at 156-57. Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal on November 14,2003 
with the Utah Supreme Court which subsequently transferred this matter to this Court on 
January 14, 2004. F.R. at 163-65.2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
RedV sets forth below a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented to 
this Court for review. 
A. The Emails. 
Plaintiff Daniel Garriott alleges he received an email from sender "Norm" at the 
email address "prosperl007538w71@winning.com" on September 7, 2002. G.R. at 5-6. 
The email advertised RedV's PopupProtector™. Id. at 6. Plaintiff Jane Johnson alleges 
she received an email advertising RedV's PopupProtector™ on September 8, 2002 from 
"ProConsumer" at the email address "Statt2447p00@prontomail.com." J.R. at 4-5. 
The Plaintiffs each filed a separate Complaint alleging substantially identical claims 
against RedV, which were consolidated by the trial court into a single action. F.R. at 
126-37. 
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Plaintiff Brittney Fenn alleges she received an email on September 9, 2002 from 
"ClickForMail" at the email address "cfm@clickformail.com" advertising RedV's 
historyProtector™. F.R. at 5. 
B. RedV's Products and Policies. 
RedV is a Washington corporation with all rights and title to technology used to 
remove certain components from Internet programs and pop-up browser windows. F.R. 
at 63; G.R. at 41; J.R. at 32. RedV has incorporated its proprietary technology into a 
group of software products known as "ProtectorSuite" software. Id. RedV markets its 
software through its "RedV Network Affiliate Program" by contracting with independent 
contractors ("Promoters"). Id. To become a Promoter, an independent contractor must 
agree to all of the terms of the RedV Network Affiliate Program Agreement Statement 
(the "Independent Contractor Agreement"). Id. Pursuant to the Independent Contractor 
Agreement, RedV does not control the day-to-day operations of its Promoters or the 
marketing methods employed by the Promoters. Id. 
Pursuant to the Independent Contractor Agreement, Promoters must agree to 
comply with the RedV Anti-Spam Agreement. F.R. at 63-64, 67; G.R. at 41-42, 45; J.R. 
at 32-33, 36. The Anti-Spam Agreement strictly prohibits the promotion of RedV 
products through the use of unsolicited commercial email ("Spam"). F.R. at 63-64, 120; 
G.R. at 41-42; J.R. at 32-33. The Anti-Spam Agreement requires each Promoter to "enter 
into an agreement that the Promoter shall not use SPAM in its promotion of RedV's 
products." Id. RedV refuses to engage in any business relationships with an independent 
contractor who is unwilling to accept the terms of the anti-spam policy. Id. The Anti-
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Spam Agreement was in effect at the time of the complained-of emails. F.R. at 120. 
RedV maintains a list of all current and former independent contractors and their email 
addresses. F.R. at 64; G.R. at 42; J.R. at 33. 
C. The Nexus Between RedV and the Emails. 
At the time the Plaintiffs received the emails, RedV did not, nor has it ever had, 
email addresses for "Norm", "ClickForMail" or "ProConsumer". F.R. at 64-65; G.R. at 
42-43; J.R. at 33-34. 
RedV did not send the September 7, 2002 email to Garriott. Id. RedV did not 
send the September 8, 2002 email to Johnson. Id. RedV did not send the September 9, 
2002 email to Fenn. Id. RedV has never had Garriott, Johnson or Fenn's email 
addresses. Id. It is undisputed that the emails were not sent by RedV to any of the 
Plaintiffs. F.R. at 133; G.R. at 143; J.R. at 78. 
D. The Act's Safe Harbor For Employers 
The Utah Legislature passed the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit 
Email Act (the "Act") in 2002. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-101 et seq. (2002). The 
Act outlines the requirements for unsolicited commercial emails ("UCEs"), commonly 
known as "spam". Id. The Act also specifically creates a safe harbor for employers 
whose employees violate the Act, provided the "employee's violation . . . is also a 
violation of an established policy of the employer" against sending spam. Id. at 13-36-
105(4). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs claim that because the emails they received advertised RedV's products, 
RedV must have sent them or caused them to be sent. Plaintiffs' attempt to hold RedV 
liable for the emails consists of little more than an attempt to construe a statute contrary 
to Utah's well established agency principles, and to carve out a new exception directly 
opposing those principles. The independent contractor theory forward by Plaintiffs 
would reverse decades of settled legal principles whereby employers are not held 
vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractors where the employer does not 
control the day-to-day operations of the independent contractor. As a result, this appeal 
does not present an issue of first impression, but a review of well-settled agency 
principles, as applied to the Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act 
(the "Act"). See Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-101, etseq. (2002). 
In addition, the Act creates a safe harbor for employers when their employees, in 
direct violation of established company policy, break the law. The legislative policy 
embodied in providing an exemption from liability for employers whose employees 
violate the Act applies with equal force to those who work through independent 
contractors. The Legislature created the safe harbor for the circumstances presented by 
this case, and RedV should be allowed to take advantage of the Act's protections. 
This appeal also addresses the question of whether the district court erred when it 
determined that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. At no time while RedV's motion for summary judgment 
was pending did Plaintiffs counter the statements in Kavner's affidavit regarding either 
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RedV's relationship to its Promoters or RedV's Anti-Spam Agreement. Plaintiffs never 
even made a Rule 56(f) request for discovery prior to the grant of summary judgment. 
Moreover, the "new information" upon which the motion to alter or amend was based, 
was known, but not used by, Plaintiffs, at the time they filed their opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. In light of this, the trial court did not err in granting 
summary judgment and did not err in denying Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend. 
ARGUMENT 
The district court did not err in finding that RedV may not be held vicariously 
liable for the actions of an independent contractor who may have sent unsolicited emails 
("UCEs") in violation of the Act. Nor did the district court err in refusing to alter or 
amend its judgment when the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the proffered justification for the motion 
to alter or amend was known to Plaintiffs when they opposed summary judgment. This 
Court should therefore affirm the district court's determination that summary judgment 
was appropriately granted. 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Disposed of Plaintiffs' Claims On Summary 
Judgment Because There Were No Disputed Material Facts and Utah's 
Settled Agency Principles Dictate That RedV Was Entitled To Judgment As 
A Matter of Law, 
The trial court correctly ruled on RedV's Summary Judgment motion because 
there were no disputed material facts and RedV was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court reviews an appeal from a district court's 
"decision to grant summary judgment... for correctness." Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,1fl2, 
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491 Utah Adv. Rep. 15; Smith, 2003 UT 23, lfl3, 70 P.3d 904; Woodbury Amsource, 
Inc., 2003 UT 28, \ 4, 73 P.3d 362 (explaining that in reviewing a summary judgment 
pursuant to Rule 56 "we consider whether the trial court correctly concluded that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and whether it correctly applied the law"). "On an 
appeal of a district court's entry of summary judgment, [an appellate court] appl[ies] the 
same standard as applied by the district court." Smith, 2003 UT 23, U 13, 70 P.3d 904. 
On appeal, Plaintiffs invite this Court to supplant the standard adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court for employer liability for the acts of independent contractors (the standard 
employed by the district court) with a new standard that has never been applied by a Utah 
court. Because there is no basis in Utah jurisprudence for Plaintiffs' position, this Court 
should decline their request and adhere to the well-founded principles outlined by the 
Utah Supreme Court and affirm the district court's decision. See infra. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Found that Whether RedV Promoters Were 
RedV Independent Contractors or Employees, RedV Cannot be Liable 
Under the Act as a Matter of Law. 
Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that RedV sent them the emails they received. Despite 
their inability to support that assertion with anything but speculation, the District Court 
viewed all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, and assumed that the emails were sent by either 
RedV employees or independent contractors.3 The Court correctly found that even with 
the benefit of that assumption, Plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. F.R. at 132; 
3
 Plaintiffs argue that because the emails they received advertised RedV's products, 
RedV must have sent them or caused them to be sent. Using Plaintiffs' logic, if a grocery 
store sent an unsolicited email advertising a sale on Com Flakes, it would be Kellogg's, 
and not the grocery store, that is liable for the violation of the Act. 
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G.R. at 143; J.R. at 78. The District Court correctly reasoned that under well-settled 
principles of independent contractor law, RedV could not be held liable for the actions of 
its independent contractors. The Court also found that RedV would qualify for the 
statutory exemption from liability the Act provides to employers with established anti-
spam policies. 
B. The District Court Correctly Held That As A Matter of Law RedV Is 
Not Liable For Acts of Its Independent Contractor 
As noted above, RedV markets its software through Promoters. See infra at 10. 
Under its Independent Contractor Agreement with these Promoters, RedV does not 
control the day-to-day operations of the Promoters. Id. Nor does RedV control the 
marketing efforts of these Promoters, except that each Promoter is required to agree to an 
Anti-Spam Agreement, which prohibits sales through unsolicited emails. Id. 
In Utah, "an independent contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular 
project or piece of work, usually for a set total sum, who may do the job in his or her own 
way, subject to only minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only for its 
satisfactory completion." Smith, 2003 UT 23,1f 27, 70 P.3d 904 (citing Utah Home Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ^  11, 985 P.2d 243 (citing Harry L. Young & Sons v. 
Ashton, 538 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1975))) (reiterating Utah's general definition of 
independent contractors). "Utah adheres to the general common law rule that 'the 
employer of an independent contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another 
by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants.9" Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 
1f 13, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (quoting Restatement § 409) (citing Gleason v. Salt Lake City, 74 
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P.2d 1225, 1232 (Utah 1937). As such, "one who hires an independent contractor and 
does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed 
owes no duty of care" and is not responsible for the independent contractor's actions. Id. 
(citing W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed. 1984)). 
Under Utah law, a few narrow exceptions to the general rule of no liability for 
actions by independent contracts exist. See, e.g., Gleason, 74 P.2d at 1232; Thompson, 
979 P.2d at 326. However, the exceptions are limited to situations where an employer of 
an independent contractor "exercises enough control over the contracted work to give rise 
to a limited duty of care " Thompson, 979 P.2d at 326. 
The district court correctly applied these principles to the undisputed material facts 
of this case and appropriately concluded that "assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
one or more of RedV's independent contractors was (were) actually responsible for 
sending the offending UCEs, and that such actions caused tortious injury to Plaintiffs, 
under governing precedent the Court concludes that RedV would not be legally 
responsible for those actions." F.R. at 134; G.R. at 144; J.R. at 79. In looking at the 
exceptions to the general rule, the court correctly concluded that "[t]he exception does 
not apply [to RedV] because the undisputed facts are that "RedV does not control the 
day-to-day operations of its [Promoters] or the marketing methods employed by the 
[Promoters]." F.R. at 134; G.R. at 144; J.R. at 79. The district court correctly refused to 
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apply the limited exceptions to RedV, as a matter of law, because undisputedly RedV 
does not control the day-to-day operations of its independent contractors.4 
The district court's correct application of Utah's law to these facts, even viewed in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, appropriately determined that RedV, as a matter of 
law, cannot be held liable for the UCEs received by Plaintiffs. 
C. The District Court Correctly Determined, As A Matter of Law, That 
RedV's Anti-Spam Agreement Required RedV's Independent 
Contractors to Comply With the Act. 
While general independent contractor law would be enough to free RedV from 
liability, the district court also found that its conclusion was "bolstered by the Act's plain 
language, which creates an exception to liability for unsolicited emails sent by an entity's 
employees." F.R. at 111; G.R. at 145; J.R. at 81. The Act provides that: 
The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does not subject the 
employee's employer to liability under that section if the employee's 
violation of Section 13-36-103 is also a violation of an established policy of 
the employer that requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-
36-103. 
Utah Code § 13-36-105(4). 
RedV's Anti-Spam Agreement specifically requires its Promoters "not to use 
SPAM in its promotion of RedV's products." F.R. at 63-64, 120; G.R. at 41-42; J.R. at 
4
 Plaintiffs argue that Utah Code Section 13-36-103(3) imposes liability upon those who 
send email through "a subsidiary or affiliate." See Aplt's. Br. at 10. However, that 
provision merely states that if a recipient of an email notifies the sender that he does not 
wish to receive additional emails, the sender may not send additional emails through a 
"subsidiary or affiliate." That language could not have been intended to undo years of 
independent contractor case law and impose strict liability upon a company whose 
independent contractors violate both the Act and their contractual anti-spam agreements. 
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32-33. RedV's Anti-Spam Agreement regarding unsolicited emails was in full force and 
effect at the time Plaintiffs received the offending emails. F.R. at 120.5 The district court 
found, as a matter of law, the requirements of the Agreement were "consistent with the 
provisions of Utah's Act" and that, therefore, RedV could not be held liable for emails 
sent in contravention of its established policy. F.R. at 134; G.R. at 144; J.R. at 79. 
D. It Would Be Illogical And Contrary To Utah's Weil-Established 
Agency Principles To Carve Out A New Exception Allowing RedV To 
Be Held Liable For An Independent Contractor's Actions Where The 
Act Specifically Immunizes An Employer From An Employee's 
Actions. 
Plaintiffs would have this Court believe that by following established precedent, 
the district court "did . . . violence" to Utah law. Aplt's. Br. at 19. To the contrary, it is 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Act that forwards a rule which is diametrically opposed to 
Utah's well-established agency principles and Utah Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
The district court correctly concluded that "even if the individuals or entities that 
sent Plaintiffs the offending UCES are (or were) RedV Promoters, RedV itself cannot be 
held liable under the Act on the theory that RedV "caused those UCEs to be sent. If sent 
by RedV Promoters, the actions of those alleged Promoters were clearly unauthorized 
under the explicit terms of RedV's policies." F.R. at 135; G.R. at 145; J.R. at 80. 
5
 Plaintiffs try to make hay out of the fact that at some point, Redv modified its Anti-
Spam Agreement and made more explicit the terms on which its Promoters could send 
solicited emails. Aplt's Br. 14-15. Plaintiffs conveniently ignore that both versions of 
the Anti-Spam Agreement strictly forbid its Promoters from sending any unsolicited 
emails. Compare F.R. at 71-72 with F.R. at 151. In this respect, RedV's Anti-Spam 
Agreements are tougher than Utah law which permits unsolicited emails to be sent if the 
emails conform to certain requirements. See Utah Code § 13-36-103(1). 
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The district court also found that the plain language of the Act: 
creates an exception to liability for unsolicited emails sent by an entity's 
employees: 'The violation of section 13-36-103 by an employees does not 
subject the employee's employer to liability under that section if the 
employee's violation of Section 13-26-103 is also a violation of an 
established policy of the employer that requires compliance with the 
requirements of Section 13-36-103.' Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105(4) 
(Supp.2002). 
F.R. at 135; G.R. at 145; J.R. at 80. RedV's agreements with its Promoters outline the 
established policies of the company and how RedV's products may not be marketed. 
Those established policies expressly require RedV representatives to 
comply with all the particulars of state anti-spam laws. Thus, if an 
employee's unauthorized actions would not subject RedV to liability under 
the Act for its actions taken in derogation of its company's established 
policy, then similar unauthorized actions by independent contractors cannot 
be construed to create liability. 
Id. 
Allowing Plaintiffs to carve out a new exception allowing RedV to be held liable 
for an independent contractor's actions, where the statute specifically immunizes an 
employer from even an employee's actions, does violence to the Act. Stated differently, 
if the emails had been sent by RedV employees, RedV would not be liable because of its 
anti-spam policies. This puts Plaintiffs in the intellectually awkward position of arguing 
that despite RedV's anti-spam policy, it should be held liable because its promoters were 
independent contractors, not employees. This Court should not be persuaded to allow 
such a odd result under Utah law. As such, the district court should be affirmed. 
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E. The District Court Correctly Found That There Were No Disputed 
Facts Material In Determining RedV's Liability Under the Act 
Plaintiffs argue here, as below, that genuine issues of material fact existed that 
prevented the entry of summary judgment. Aplt's Br. at 13-17. The trial court correctly 
refused to allow Plaintiffs to generate "disputed facts" in order to avoid summary 
judgment. Smith, 2003 UT 23,1J13, 70 P.3d 904; F.R. at 131, G.R. at 142; J.R. at 77 
(finding "there are no material issues of fact in dispute"). 
In its motion for summary judgment, RedV presented the following undisputed 
facts, which it supported by citations to the factual record: 
• RedV did not, and has never sent an email to any of the Plaintiffs; 
• RedV has, and has always had an anti-spam policy; 
• RedV hires only independent contractors ("Promoters"); 
• RedV does not control the day-to-day operations of its Promoters; and 
• As a condition of being a RedV Promoter, each Promoter must agree to 
RedV's anti-spam policy. 
J.R. at 19-22. 
1. Plaintiffs Cannot Create An Issue of Fact With Affidavits Not 
Based Upon Personal Knowledge. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that Utah law required them to oppose summary judgment 
by making specific citations to the factual record sufficient to show a genuine factual 
issue. Aplt's Br. at 16-17. Plaintiffs implicitly argue that they made this showing by 
forwarding affidavits from the Plaintiffs' themselves. 
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Summary judgment cannot, however, be defeated by presenting an affidavit that 
contains factually unsupported and conclusory statements which are not based on first 
hand knowledge. See Regan Outdoor Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 
1984). The district court correctly applied this principle. See F.R. at 132; G.R. at 142-
43; J.R. at 77-78 (explaining that "[affidavits supporting or opposing motion for 
summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge." (citing Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985)). 
Plaintiffs' affidavits contained nothing more than hollow and repeated assertions 
that RedV "sent" them the emails they received. See G.R. at 78-91. However, the 
Affidavits themselves recite that they received emails from senders identified as 
"cfin@xlickfonnail.com", "statt2447p00@prontomail.com" and "prosper 1007538w71@ 
winning.com." Id. Plaintiffs' Affidavits conclude and assume that those emails were 
sent "by or at the behest" of RedV." Id. But this conclusion is nothing more than 
allegation. It is impossible for Plaintiffs to "know" who sent them the emails. All 
anyone "knows" is that RedV's products were advertised in the emails. Because of this, 
the district court correctly concluded that the Affidavits "simply cannot have been made 
from personal knowledge" and that the Affidavits could not, therefore, create a genuine 
issue of material fact. See F.R. at 132; G.R. at 142-43; J.R. at 77-78. 
2. The Revisions to RedV's Anti-Spam Policy Do Not Create a 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact. 
Plaintiffs argue here that genuine issues of material fact exist because RedV has 
two different Anti-Spam Agreements with its Promoters. Aplt's Br. at 14-15. Plaintiffs 
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conclude that because there are two versions of the agreement, "there is at least a 
reasonable inference that the policies are a fabrication." Id. As an initial matter, RedV 
cannot follow Plaintiffs' logic. RedV cannot see why modifications to the Anti-Spam 
Agreement, which did not change the underlying policy (that is, promoters may not send 
unsolicited emails), create an inference that the policies were fabricated for litigation 
purposes. 
More importantly, however, the changes to the Agreement only made more 
explicit the rules for sending out solicited emails; emails that the sender has requested to 
receive. The policy against unsolicited emails, those that violate the Act, is the same in 
both policies: RedV promoters may not use unsolicited emails to advertise RedV's 
products. Compare F.R. at 71-72 with F.R. at 151. As such, no matter which policy the 
district court examined, the underlying analysis was the same. Simply stated, Plaintiffs 
pointed to nothing in the record that would create a genuine issue of material fact to 
prevent the entry of summary judgment.6 
II. The District Court Correctly Analyzed Plaintiffs' Failure To Conduct 
Discovery or Seek Protection From the Court to Allow Discovery Prior to 
Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56(f), Thus Its Order Denying 
Plaintiffs Request To Conduct Discovery Should Be Upheld. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiffs to 
conduct further discovery even though Plaintiffs failed to follow the procedures outlined 
6
 As discussed herein, Plaintiffs, despite having all the relevant information at their 
fingertips, did not raise this as an issue until after the district court had granted summary 
judgment. See infra at III. 
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in Rule 56(f), and did not request additional discovery until after summary judgment was 
granted. 
Under Brown, a party seeking to overcome a motion for summary judgment in 
order to conduct further discovery must strictly comply with Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(f). Brown, 2000 UT 89, at f 29. On appeal this Court "reviewfs] a district 
court's rule 56(f) discovery rulings for abuse of discretion." Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, f 56, 
70 P.3d 1; Brown, 2000 UT 89,1f 29, 16 P.3d 540 (affirming district court's 56(f) ruling). 
The district court's order should not be reversed "unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability." Crossland Savings, 877 P.2d at 1243 (explaining Court's standard of 
review of a 56(f) motion). 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Applied Utah's Rule 56(f) to Plaintiffs 
Procedurally Defective Request For Discovery. 
The rule at issue here, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), governs an attempt to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment by asserting a lack of factual information. See 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, at [^ 42. To defeat summary judgment, the non-movant must 
file an affidavit to show that additional discovery was required about a fact material to 
the issues upon which summary judgment motion is based. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f); 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, at J^ 42 (affirming summary judgment despite non-moving 
party's requests for further discovery due to failure to comply with Rule 56(f)); see also 
Crossland Savings, 877 P.2d at 1243 (explaining that a Rule 56(f) affidavit must "stat[e] 
reasons why the party is presently unable to submit evidentiary affidavits in opposition to 
the moving party's supporting affidavits."). The affidavit must "demonstrate how 
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additional discovery would be of any assistance to their response to Defendants' 
[summary judgment] motion.' Simply asserting that more discovery is needed . . . is 
inadequate to overcome summary judgment." Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, at Tf 57 (quoting 
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, \ 36, 54 P.3d 1054). 
In Sonnenreich, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the non-moving party's 
argument that they should have been allowed to "elicit" information from the moving 
party. Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, at f 41. However, the non-moving party "presented no 
evidence countering [the movant's] affidavit...[and] [h]ad the [the non-movant] wished 
to rebut [the] affidavit, it should have moved for further discovery pursuant to rule 56(f). 
. . . " M a t t 4 2 . 
Although Rule 56(f) operates as a safeguard against premature summary judgment 
motions, the rule only protects those parties moving their cases forward via discovery. 
"An important objective of rule 56(f) is to ensure that a diligent party has been provided 
adequate opportunity for discovery" but only if "there has been compliance with a statute 
to compel discovery." Brown, 2000 UT 89, ^ [29; 16 P.3d 540 (citations and quotations 
omitted) (emphasis added). "However, the trial court need not grant rule 56(f) motions 
that are dilatory or lacking in merit." Crossland Savings, 877 P.2d at 1243 (affirming 
trial court's denial of a Rule 56(f) motion despite only four months from filing of the 
complaint to summary judgment based on opposing party's "apparent lack of interest in 
discovery" during that period). 
Where the Court has found dilatory conduct coupled with a Rule 56(f) motion, 
discovery has been denied. Id. For example, in Crossland Savings, the Utah Supreme 
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Court found that failure to make any discovery requests during the four month life-span 
of the case prior to summary judgment was dilatory conduct even with the submittal of a 
Rule 56(f) motion. Id. 
When a party utterly disregards the requirement to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit, the 
Utah Supreme Court has categorized a subsequent "request to reverse summary judgment 
to allow discovery [as] not properly raised before the district court" and the Supreme 
Court has refused to address the issue on appeal. Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, at ^ 57 (citing 
Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 n.2 (Utah 1996)) (finding a post 
summary judgment 56(f) motion to be untimely and not properly before the appellate 
court). 
Plaintiffs offer no meaningful evidence to show that they complied with Rule 
5 6(f)'s requirement of conducting or requesting discovery, coupled with a supporting 
affidavit stating that additional discovery was essential to effectively oppose RedV's 
summary judgment motion. Indeed, Plaintiffs made no Rule 56(f) request while the 
motion for summary judgment was pending, and their belated request for discovery was 
not accompanied by an affidavit. 
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs now attempt to cry foul, claiming that they were not given 
sufficient time to conduct discovery. See Aplt's. Br. at 18. In fact, the record shows that 
Plaintiffs never asked the district court or RedV or any third party for discovery until 
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after RedV's motion for summary judgment was granted.7 F.R. at 116. More tellingly, 
seven months elapsed between the filing of the complaints and the summary judgment 
decision without Plaintiffs serving a single interrogatory or asking for a single deposition. 
F.R. at 1-6, 126-39; G.R. at 1-7, 139-46; J.R. at 1-5, 74-81. To the contrary, the record 
here clearly indicates Plaintiffs had more time than the parties in Crossland Savings for 
discovery. F.R. at 1-6, 126-39; G.R. at 1-7, 139-46; J.R. at 1-5, 74-81 (indicating more 
than seven months from filing of the Complaint to Order granting summary judgment). 
Seven months is more than ample time to send out interrogatories, or notice a deposition. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' "conclusory assertions" that they needed more discovery are 
inadequate under Grynberg and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow Plaintiff discovery based upon Plaintiffs' generic requests. Grynberg, 2003 UT 8, 
at f 57 (citations omitted). The trial court correctly applied the Utah Supreme Court's 
mandate when it determined that Plaintiffs' discovery requests were untimely and 
procedurally inappropriate. It was well within the trial court's discretion to refuse 
Plaintiffs' requests for additional discovery. 
B. The Trial Court's Order Was Correct Under Federal Law As Well. 
Plaintiffs argue here, as below, that summary judgment was procedurally 
improper. This proposition is so contrary to current law that Plaintiffs are only able to 
direct this court to a 1942 decision penned by the Third Circuit to support its argument. 
7
 Plaintiffs did alert the district court to the fact that "[t]here has been no discovery in 
this case." G.R. at 66. However, at no time before, after or in that pleading did Plaintiffs 
ever request discovery. 
639824v2 21 
Aplt. Br. at 17. Since that opinion, then the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
well as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been developed and explained through 
legions of opinions dealing with discovery procedures - which allow defendants to move 
for summary judgment at any time. Utah has governing rules and case law interpreting 
those rules. See Utah R. Civ. P. 1 (directing Utah's rules to govern "all actions" in Utah 
courts). As such, Plaintiffs' 1942 case should be only noted as an historical point of 
interest. Today, virtually all modern federal decisions follow the same rule announced by 
the Utah Supreme Court. In Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., this Court explained both 
Utah's law, and comparable federal law, regarding the applicability of Rule 56(f) to 
situations such as presented here by Plaintiffs. 
A majority of federal cases interpreting an identical rule 56(f) hold that 
filing an affidavit is necessary for the preservation of a Rule 56(f) 
contention that summary judgment should be delayed pending further 
discovery. Although the courts recognize that this requirement should be 
applied liberally, the courts are also unwilling to "spare the litigants from 
their own lack of diligence." In accord with this view the Utah Supreme 
Court recently refused to consider an argument that further discovery was 
necessary when the appellant had failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. 
Callioux, 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted); Thomas v. 
Pacificorp, 324 F.3d 1176, 1179 (10th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "where a party 
opposing summary judgment and seeking a continuance pending completion of discovery 
fails to take advantage of the shelter provided by Rule 56(f) by filing an affidavit, there is 
no abuse of discretion in granting summary judgment if it is otherwise appropriate"). 
Federal courts strictly apply the requirement that a Rule 56(f) affidavit be submitted 
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"prior to the summary judgment hearing." Ashton-Tate Corp, v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 519-
20 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Even the United States Supreme Court has instructed that the purpose of Rule 
56(f) is to deal with "potential problem[s] with . . . premature motions [for summary 
judgment that] can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f) which allows a summary 
judgment motion to be denied . . . . " Cleotex Corp, v. Catrett, All U.S. 317 (1986) 
(explaining that Rule 56(f) protects a party from being "'railroaded' by a premature 
motion for summary judgment"). Plaintiffs were not 'railroaded' in the seven months 
this case was pending below. Plaintiffs just acted with indifference in pursuing this case. 
Plaintiffs never sought discovery, and never asked the Court for discovery prior to 
summary judgment. "Rule 56(f) does not operate automatically. Its protections must be 
invoked and can be applied only if a party satisfies certain requirements" - specifically 
filing an affidavit which "must explain why facts precluding summary judgment cannot 
be presented." Price v. Western Resources, Inc., 232 F.3d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming summary judgment when nonmoving party requested continuance for further 
discovery in the body of their opposition memo, rather than in an affidavit) (emphasis 
added); Int 7 Surplus Lines Ins. Co, v. Wyoming Coal Refining Systems, Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 
905 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that Rule 56(f)'s "protection arises only if the 
nonmoving party files an affidavit explaining why he or she cannot present facts to 
oppose the motion"). 
Because Utah's case law (as well as the federal opinions) requires Plaintiffs to 
have requested discovery pursuant to a Rule 56(f) affidavit prior to summary judgment, 
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there is no reason this Court should reach a different result. Plaintiffs' dilatory conduct 
should not be rewarded. The trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' request was 
not properly before the trial court, consequently that order should be affirmed. 
III. The District Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs9 Motion to Alter or Amend 
Because the "New Information" Upon Which the Motion Was Based Was 
Known to. But Not Used by. Plaintiffs at the Time They Opposed Summary 
Judgment 
After the entry of summary judgment, Plaintiffs moved under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59 and 60 to alter or amend the judgment. The alteration or amendment 
Plaintiffs sought was the vacation of the summary judgment order. Plaintiffs raised two 
arguments in favor of amending the judgment: (1) it needed discovery; (2) "information 
recently brought to counsel's attention" justified the district court denying the previously 
granted summary judgment motion. F.R. at 133-15. As already explained, the district 
court properly denied the request for discovery because it did not comply with Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(f) and was filed only after the motion for summary judgment had 
been granted. See e.g. F.R. at 3. 
Plaintiffs' "new information" argument fairs no better. Under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(4), a court may amend its judgment based upon "newly discovered 
evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(4). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows relief from a final judgment or order based 
upon "newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered 
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in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). The district 
court found that Plaintiffs could not make that showing. F.R. at 161-162. 
The district court was correct. The "new information" that Plaintiffs argued 
justified its motion was the fact that RedV had two versions of its Anti-Spam Agreement. 
F.R. at 113-120. This information was not, however, "newly discovered" within the 
meaning of Rules 59 and 60. Plaintiffs, by their own admission, had both versions of the 
policy at the time they opposed summary judgment. Aplt's Br. at 14. As such, they 
cannot credibly claim that the information could not have been discovered with 
"reasonable diligence" or "by due diligence" as the Rules require. 
Moreover, the "new information" was not material. As explained herein, both 
versions of the Anti-Spam Agreement contain explicit provisions banning the use of 
unsolicited emails by its Promoters. The changes to those policies, which involved the 
circumstances under which a Promoter could send a solicitated email, was not material to 
the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental issue in this case is, as the district court concluded, whether 
RedV may be held vicariously liable for the actions of an independent contractor under 
Utah's established agency principles. The district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it determined that RedV is not vicariously liable for the torts of an independent contractor 
when it does not control the day-to-day operations of the independent contractor. This 
Court should affirm the district court's decision dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against 
RedV. 
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This Court should also affirm the District Court's finding that RedV can take 
refuse in the safe harbor provided under the Act. The Act specifically exempts 
employers from liability when an employee violates established policies and a logical and 
natural extension of that exemption flows to a release of liability for employers of 
independent contractors. Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court because 
even if the emails had been sent by RedV employees, the Act's exemption for companies 
with anti-spam policies would shield RedV from liability. 
This Court should affirm the district court's application of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(f), by holding that Plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirements when it 
did not submit an affidavit requesting additional discovery in order to defeat summary 
judgment. By following established Utah law, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to allow Plaintiffs to defeat summary judgment for lack of their 
own diligence. 
Finally, this Court should affirm the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' motion to 
alter or amend the judgment. The alleged justification for the amendment was 
information that was available to, but ignored by, Plaintiffs in their opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. Moreover, that information was immaterial to the 
outcome of the summary judgment motion. 
DATED this 21 st day of April, 2004. 
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ADDENDUM "A 
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to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard fromadefaultjudgmentinacity court ran from 
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, the date of notice of entry of such judgment, 
475 P2d 1005 (1970). rather than from the date of judgment. Buck-
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action, ner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 288 P2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank & 
ground that their counsel had an already Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d). 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
motion days between time objection was filed Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P2d 92 (Utah 1986); 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 P3d 277. 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. 
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham Opening default or default judgment claimed 
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. to have been obtained because of attorney's 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
265 et seq. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. Failure to give notice of application for de-
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to fault judgment where notice is required only by 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
A.L.R.3d 1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 56, FRCP. 
Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-Let seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Effect of denial. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Intent to remove trustee. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
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(5) whether the franchisees of the same line-make in 
that relevant market area are providing adequate service 
to consumers for the powersport vehicles of the line-make, 
which shall include the adequacy of the powersport vehi-
cle sale and service facilities, equipment, supply of vehicle 
parts , and qualified service personnel. 2002 
13-35-307. Franchisor's repurchase obl igat ions upon 
terminat ion or noncont inuat ion of franchise . 
(1) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise 
by the franchisor, the franchisor shall pay the franchisee: 
(a) the franchisee's cost of new, undamaged, and unsold 
powersport vehicles in the franchisee's inventory acquired 
from the franchisor or another franchisee of the same 
line-make representing both the current model year at 
the time of termination or noncontinuation and the im-
mediately prior model year vehicles: 
(i) plus any charges made by the franchisor, for 
distribution, delivery, or taxes; 
(ii) plus the franchisee's cost of any accessories 
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased; and 
(iii) less all allowances paid or credited to the 
franchisee by the franchisor; 
(b) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsold sup-
plies, parts, and accessories as set forth in the franchisor's 
catalog at the time of termination or noncontinuation for 
the supplies, parts , and accessories, less all allowances 
paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor; 
(c) the fair market value, but not less than the franchi-
see's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign 
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name, trade 
name, or trademark of the franchisor if acquisition of the 
sign was recommended or required by the franchisor. If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed, 
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro rata portion of 
the sign; 
(d) the fair market value, but not less than the fran-
chisee's depreciated acquisition cost of all special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved by the franchisor tha t were recom-
mended or required by the franchisor and are in good and 
usable condition; and 
(e) the cost of transporting, handling, packing, and 
loading powersport vehicles, supplies, parts , accessories, 
signs, special tools, equipment, and furnishings. 
(2) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts 
specified in Subsection (1) within 90 days after the tender of 
the property to the franchisor if the franchisee: 
(a) has clear title to the property; and 
(b) is in a position to convey title to the franchisor. 
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are subject to a 
security interest, the franchisor may make payment jointly to 
the franchisee and to the holder of the security interest. 2002 
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13-36-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act." 2002 
13-36-102. Definit ions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commercial" means for the purpose of promoting 
the sale, lease, or exchange of goods, services, or real 
property. 
(2) "Computer network" means two or more computers 
that are interconnected to exchange electronic messages, 
files, data, or other information. 
(3) "Email" means an electronic message, file, data, or 
other information tha t is transmitted: 
(a) between two or more computers, computer net-
works, or electronic terminals; or 
(b) within a computer network. 
(4) "Email address" means a destination, commonly 
expressed as a string of characters, to which email may be 
sent or delivered. 
(5) "Email service provider" means a person that: 
(a) is an intermediary in the transmission of email 
from the sender to the recipient; or 
(b) provides to end users of email service the 
ability to send and receive email. 
(6) "Internet domain name" means a globally unique, 
hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service, 
assigned through centralized Internet authorities, com-
prising a series of character strings separated by periods, 
with the right-most string specifying the top of the hier-
archy. 
(7) (a) "Sexually explicit email" means an email that 
contains, promotes, or contains an electronic link to 
material that is harmful to minors, as defined in 
Section 76-10-1201. 
(b) An email is a "sexually explicit email" if it 
meets the definition in Subsection (7)(a), even if the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email. 
(8) (a) "Unsolicited" means without the recipient's ex-
press permission, except as provided in Subsection 
(8Kb). 
(b) A commercial email is not "unsolicited" if the 
sender has a preexisting business or personal rela-
tionship with the recipient. 2002 
13-36-103. Unsol ic i ted commercial or sexual ly expl ic i t 
email — Requirements . 
(1) Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic-
ited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state shall: 
(a) conspicuously state in the email the sender's: 
(i) legal name; 
(ii) correct street address; and 
(iii) valid Internet domain name; 
(b) include in the email a subject line tha t contains: 
(i) for a commercial email, "ADV:" as the first four 
characters; or 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email, "ADV:ADULT" as 
the first nine characters; 
(c) provide the recipient a convenient, no-cost mecha-
nism to notify the sender not to send any future email to 
the recipient, including: 
(i) return email to a valid, functioning return elec-
tronic address; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, the sender's toll-
free telephone number; and 
(d) conspicuously provide in the text of the email a 
notice that: 
(i) informs the recipient tha t the recipient may 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from future 
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commercial or sexually explicit email, as the case 
may be, from the sender; and 
(ii) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number, includes the send-
er's valid, toll-free telephone number that the recipi-
ent may call to be excluded from future email from 
the sender. 
(2) A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited 
commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by a resident of the 
state may not: 
(a) use a third party's Internet domain name in identi-
fying the point of origin or in stating the transmission 
path of the email without the third party's consent; 
(b) misrepresent any information in identifying the 
point of origin or the transmission path of the email; or 
(c) fail to include in the email the information neces-
sary to identify the point of origin of the email. 
(3) If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
unsolicited sexually explicit email notifies the sender that the 
recipient does not want to receive future commercial email or 
future sexually explicit email, respectively, from the sender, 
the sender may not send that recipient a commercial email or 
a sexually explicit email, as the case may be, either directly or 
through a subsidiary or affiliate. 2002 
13-36-104. Criminal penalty. 
(1) A person who violates any requirement of Section 13-
36-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a result of 
a criminal conviction under Subsection (1) does not relieve the 
person convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action 
under Section 13-36-105. 2002 
13-36-105. Civil action for violation — Election on 
damages — Costs and attorney fees — De-
fense. 
(1) For any violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103, an 
action may be brought by: 
(a) a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
email or unsolicited sexually explicit email with respect to 
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred; or 
(b) an email service provider through whose facilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted. 
(2) In each action under Subsection (1): 
(a) a recipient or email service provider may: 
(i) recover actual damages; or 
(ii) elect, in lieu of actual damages, to recover the 
lesser of: 
(A) $10 per unsolicited commercial email or 
unsolicited sexually explicit email received by 
the recipient or transmitted through the email 
service provider; or 
(B) $25,000 per day that the violation occurs; 
and 
(b) each prevailing recipient or email service provider 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees. 
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 13-
36-103 solely by being an intermediary between the sender 
and recipient in the transmission of an email that violates 
that section. 
(4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an employee does 
not subject the employee's employer to liability under that 
section if the employee's violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
a violation of an established policy of the employer that 
requires compliance with the requirements of Section 13-36-
(5) It is a defense to an action brought under this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted accidentally. 2002 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
2004] 
13-37-101. Title [Effective January 1, 2004]. 
This chapter is known as the "Notice of Intent to Sell 
Nonpublic Personal Information Act." 2003 
13-37-102. Definitions [Effective January 1, 2004]. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means a person that controls, is con-
trolled by, or is under common control with: 
(a) a commercial entity; and 
(b) (i) directly; or 
(ii) indirectly through one or more intermedi-
aries. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), "commercial en-
tity" means a person that: 
(i) has an office or other place of business 
located in the state; and 
(ii) in the ordinary course of business trans-
acts a consumer transaction in this state, 
(b) "Commercial entity" does not include: 
(i) a governmental entity; or 
(ii) an entity providing services on behalf of a 
governmental entity. 
(3) "Compensation" means anything of economic value 
that is paid or transferred to a commercial entity for or in 
direct consideration of the disclosure of nonpublic per-
sonal information. 
(4) (a) "Consumer transaction" means: 
(i) a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, 
or other written or oral transfer or disposition: 
(A) that is initiated or completed in this 
state; and 
(B) of: 
(I) goods; 
(II) services; or 
(III) other tangible or intangible 
property, except securities and insur-
ance or services related thereto; or 
